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Programs providing monetary redress for historical injustices are often 
heralded as praiseworthy acts of national accountability. However, critics 
tend to judge their implementation harshly. Those unfavorable judgments 
respond, at least in part, to trade-offs between important values that are 
“hard-wired” into the basic tools of assessment. Exposing those trade-
offs can help observers understand the compromises inherent in program 
design and, hopefully, support policy makers in creating more rational 
programs.
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Herramientas para la tragedia: procedimientos para evaluar reclamos de 
reparación históricos
Los programas que brindan compensación monetaria por injusticias 
históricas a menudo se anuncian como actos loables de responsabilidad 
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nacional. Sin embargo, los críticos tienden a juzgar su implementación 
con severidad. Esos juicios desfavorables responden, al menos en parte, a 
compensaciones entre valores importantes que están "integrados" en las 
herramientas básicas de evaluación. Exponer esas compensaciones puede 
ayudar a los observadores a comprender los compromisos inherentes 
al diseño de programas y, con suerte, ayudar a los responsables de la 
formulación de políticas a crear programas más racionales.
Palabras Clave: Palabras Clave: Derechos humanos, Reparación, Abuso 







關鍵字: 关键词: 人權, 補救, 機構虐待, 賠償, 歷史正義, 虐待兒童.
Most developed countries have programs that provide monetary redress 
to people (survivors) of historic injuries experienced as young persons in care. 
These monetary redress programs should benefit survivors, acknowledging their 
injurious experiences through remedial payments. But such redress programs 
are commonly criticized as both unjust and harmful (Daly 2018; Dion Stout 
and Harp 2007; Nagy and Gillespie 2015; Pembroke 2019; Reimer et al. 2010). 
Redress programs are often over budget, take longer than expected and, in a few 
cases, are subject to fraud. This article identifies how those problems arise and 
suggests some ways to mitigate them with reference to the procedures used to 
assess survivors’ claims.
The first monetary redress programs emerged in Canada in the 1990s and 
were quickly followed by other states (Daly 2014). The programs developed at 
a time when a growing understanding of the significant and persistent damage 
caused by childhood abuse met a “burgeoning global preoccupation with coming 
to terms with past injustices” (Torpey 2001, 357). The programs both respond 
to, and are a part of, the surfacing of what Hannah Arendt (1958, ix) termed 
“subterranean” histories. There is a growing literature situating the redress of 
institutional abuse within the larger politics of repairing historical injustices, 
often from (post)colonial or transitional justice perspectives (see e.g., Hamber 
and Lundy 2020; Henry 2015; McAuliffe 2017; Vernon 2012; Woolford 2015). 
Reflecting the broad questions raised by historical injustices, monetary redress 
programs usually emerge as part of a suite of other rectificatory initiatives, 
including apologies, public inquiries, and criminal investigations (Murray 2015).
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In the early years of the millennium, scholars interested in monetary 
redress proposed normative standards for this novel form of public policy (De 
Greiff  2006; Llewellyn 2002). Drawing from that work, in 2006 the United 
Nations published guidelines for state-run redress programs. Those guidelines 
recommend programs that are transparent, quick, effective, and fair, while 
protecting survivors’ well-being and agency (General Assembly of the United 
Nations 2006). One might also hope for procedures that realize typical public 
policy values such as cost-effectiveness and integrity (see Winter 2019). The 
first half  of this article demonstrates how the basic tools used to assess redress 
applications entail significant trade-offs (one of the “tragedies” of this article’s 
title) between those values, with different assessment techniques resulting in 
trade-offs between different values for different participants. The article then 
applies that normative analysis to three prominent program design issues: the 
use of evidentiary standards; the redress of consequential damage; and the 
responsiveness of a program’s payment values. Those three applications support 
the argument that trade-offs are unavoidable and pervasive, which, in turn, may 
help to explain persistent criticism of actual redress practice.
To understand redress policy, it is necessary to understand how participants 
with different interests and goals interact. yet, in contrast to the larger corpus 
of work on historical injustice politics, the existing literature on redress policy 
is underdeveloped, and, excepting Daly (2014), provides little data. The nature 
of redress programs impedes some standard forms of data collection. Most 
public policy initiatives modify long-lasting programs, enabling analysts to use 
longitudinal data to assess the effects of those changes. By contrast, redress 
programs tend to be novel “start-up” institutions that complete most of their 
work within a few years. Unlike those domains of public policy where researchers 
and policy designers can analyze iterative patterns of participation, redress is a 
“one shot deal”—most survivors make only a single claim. Further, survivors 
often experienced terrible injuries: including sexual abuse, physical cruelty, and 
profound neglect. As a result, survivor populations are marked by high rates of 
ill health, homelessness, unemployment, and illiteracy (Carr et al. 2019; Higgins 
2010). That marginalization aggravates practical difficulties in, and ethical 
concerns with, survivor research (Pembroke 2019, 44-5; Watson 2011, 115-6). 
These factors combine to reduce the available data for institutional analysis and, 
consequentially, for policy makers.
Although policy makers can address those problems in different ways, 
recent work emphasizes how stakeholder participation in the design process is 
important to improving the substantive outcomes, and procedural legitimacy, 
of public policy (Durose and Richardson 2015; Evans and Terrey 2016). But 
unlike other policy domains, those involved in designing redress processes rarely 
have immediate experience with redress programs. Most countries operate few 
such programs, meaning that stakeholders need to draw upon (second hand) 
experiences elsewhere. But those knowledge transfers confront methodological 
problems with comparisons. Superficially similar programs turn out, when 
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examined more closely, to be quite different. And different policy outcomes can 
result from interaction effects with other rectificatory initiatives. Compounding 
that challenge, redress programs interface with a range of preexisting social 
problems experienced by the disproportionately marginalized survivor 
population. Last, redress policy development must work within sharp normative 
constraints. The field’s morally charged character means fewer opportunities to 
use design methods of “trial and error” or prototype experimentation. When 
understood in context, these characteristics suggest that redress policy has 
features often associated with “wicked problems” (Head and Alford 2015, 714).
The article builds, methodologically, upon the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework (Heikkila and Andersson 2018). The focus is an 
example of what Elinor Ostrom (2005, 14) calls an “action situation.” Here, the 
action situation is comprised by survivors’ claims for monetary redress and the 
ways program assessors adjudicate their claims—part of what Kathleen Daly 
(2016, 164-6) terms a program’s “money logic.” A key presupposition is that 
institutional procedures affect the behaviors and understandings of interacting 
parties differently, both prospectively and in terms of outcomes. The argument 
explores how different assessment tools shape the operation of redress policy, 
entailing unavoidable and pervasive trade-offs between important values.
Fixing the usage of certain terms in advance of the discussion may help 
avoid confusion. “Redress” or “monetary redress” refers to the practice of paying 
money to remedy injuries. This is a narrower usage than “redress” often has. 
“Injurious experience” refers to all of that which comprises a survivor’s injury. 
That term is intentionally capacious, including the experience of wrongdoing 
and all subsequent damage. Note the implied distinction between the immediate 
experience of wrongdoing—the discussion often refers to “abuse” and/or 
“neglect”—and subsequently caused (consequential) “harms” or “damage.”
Turning to evidence, the discussion draws upon examples of state redress 
programs in Australia, Canada, Ireland, and Sweden. These programs provide 
evidence for, and illustrate the relevance of, the analysis for practical policy 
making. Because the inquiry concerns the means of assessing applications only, 
and is not a comprehensive program evaluation, the discussion spares the reader 
unnecessary program details. Readers seeking more program information can 
refer to sources in the footnotes.
Assessment Methods
Redress programs use a diverse set of assessment methods. This analysis 
focusses upon three categories: the primary assessment tools of rules and factors; 
secondary arrangements of rules and factors using standards and guidelines; 
and the tertiary organization of both primary and secondary techniques using 
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matrices. This taxonomy may be incomplete, but further complexity would not 
improve the analysis (see Sunstein 1996, 21-34).
Primary Assessment Techniques
Rules specify how assessors will use information ex ante. Ireland’s Magdalene 
Restorative Justice Scheme provides an effective illustration.1 Throughout the 
twentieth century, young women were wrongfully incarcerated and forced to 
labor in Ireland’s Magdalene laundries and associated institutions (O’Rourke 
2011). A small set of simple rules dominate assessment in the resulting Magdalene 
Laundries redress program (2013-present). All claimants who resided in a 
scheduled institution for three months or less received a minimum of €11,500. 
Then, for every further month of residence, the program paid €500 per month, 
up to a six-year maximum of €40,000 for the experience of forcible incarceration. 
Responding to the injury of unpaid forced labor, the scheme paid another €500 
per month, up to a ten-year maximum of €60,000. Once the period of residence 
was confirmed, assessors simply added monies payable for incarceration to 
those payable for forced labor to generate a total redress value. Validated 
applicants also received the equivalent of Ireland’s full compensatory pension 
once they reach the age of 66.
Assessment in the Magdalene program was primarily rule based: residence 
duration was the only relevant fact and every month of residence “earned” a 
specific quantum of payment. This form of rule-based assessment works well 
when it operates conditionally, with assessors putting the application through a 
sequence of tests. When the outcome of those tests can be known in advance, the 
results are predictable. In the Magdalene example, a survivor who spent twelve 
months in a laundry could know exactly how much they should receive before 
they submitted a claim. As an aside, transparency is positively associated with 
grounds for eligibility that require little interpretation. The Magdalene program 
had a single ground for eligibility—residence duration—that institutional 
records could clearly establish for some survivors.
Transparent rules of assessment enable survivors to limit their applications 
to relevant information. If  program can minimize the amount of information 
they need to administer, assessment is likely to be faster and cheaper. Equally, 
when rules determine what information is relevant, assessors know what 
information to look for within a larger corpus of potential evidence. Assessors 
can be parsimonious, amassing only the evidence needed to apply the rule(s): 
this may help minimize privacy-invading investigations. As a result, rule-based 
assessment is likely to increase the speed of assessment while imposing lower 
costs on both states and survivors.
Turning to fairness, when all assessors apply a common sequence of tests, 
rule-based assessment helps ensure that like cases are treated alike. Furthermore, 
rule-based transparency helps survivors understand how their claims should be 
1 For information on Ireland’s Magdalene redress program, see Office of the Ombudsman (2017).
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assessed. That understanding may help people accept the results of the process. 
Program officials can explain settlement values by simply matching information 
in the claim to the rules. Similarly, when rules are misapplied, applicants can 
discover errors. As a result, rules decrease an assessor’s discretionary power and 
promote fairness.
Rules are predictable, quick, fair, and cost-effective. But they are not flexible. 
Rule-based assessment requires programs to determine how information will 
be treated prior to (and abstracted from) actual cases. What rules specify as 
pertinent may not accord with experiences that survivors think are relevant. 
Similarly, rule-based assessment cannot weigh all the components of a complex 
injurious experience. And the capacity of rules to eliminate discretion and create 
fairness can be overstated. Recall how the Magdalene program used residence 
duration to set redress values. While the rule is simple, in practice, assessors 
often could not find adequate institutional records (Office of the Ombudsman 
2017, 39). Assessors using other, less dispositive, forms of evidence must judge 
what facts that evidence supports. For example, they might need to determine if  
testimony is reliable or what its content, which might be circumstantial, entails 
for residence duration. Those judgments create opportunities for discretion. 
And they are often made using factors.
A factor of assessment is a relevant consideration for which no ex ante rule 
requires an outcome. Redress WA (2008-09), operated by the State of Western 
Australia, provides clear examples.2 Redress WA responded to survivors of 
abuse and/or neglect experienced while in the care of the state. It graded 
applications according to the severity of the injury experienced. There were four 
standards of severity: moderate, serious, severe, and very severe. Assessors 
assigned applicants to one of those standards using variety of factors, including: 
the number of abusive incidents; the degree of harm sustained and the length of 
recovery; the age of the survivor when the abuse occurred; and the duration of 
the injurious experience (Government of Western Australia 2010, 65). Those 
factors of assessment did not determine outcomes, rather they “weighed” in 
favor or against certain conclusions—requiring assessors to use their judgment 
to assess claims.
Because factor-based assessment requires judgment, assessors have 
discretion over the weight given each factor, including, potentially, a zero value. 
Most programs propose some relevant factors ex ante, with more inclusive 
programs encompassing a larger set of eligible grounds for claim. Redress WA 
illustrates the potential diversity, with eligible grounds that included policy-level 
wrongdoing, abusive acts, and various forms of consequential damage: it also 
permitted claimants to introduce novel considerations. A program that aims to 
redress all the survivors’ diverse injurious experiences cannot predetermine rules 
adequate to describe those experiences. Therefore, as a program’s grounds of 
2 For information on Western Australia’s Redress WA, see Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
References Committee (2010, chapter 2).
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eligibility become more inclusive, the use of factor-based assessment tends to 
increase.
The disadvantages of factor-based assessment mirror the advantages of 
using rules. Inconsistency is a problem. The weighting of factors may differ 
from case to case and from assessor to assessor, resulting in unfairness. By 
enabling assessors to employ greater discretion, factor-based assessment is less 
transparent, meaning that survivors are less able to know how their claims will be 
assessed. Factor-based assessment also makes programs more complicated and 
harder to understand, causing survivors to have greater need of legal assistance, 
increasing procedural costs. Moreover, factor-based assessment tends to increase 
the volume of data flowing through the program because claimants are induced 
to include more potentially relevant information in their applications. Assessors 
also tend to collect more evidence. Because assessment using factors entails 
contestable judgments, assessors amass more data to support better justified 
(more defensible) decisions. As the range of potentially relevant factors widens, 
assessors take longer to identify relevant information in case files. Factor-based 
assessment will, therefore, tend to be slower, more intrusive and costly, both 
psychologically and monetarily.
Secondary Assessment Techniques
At the primary level of assessment, the disadvantages and advantages of 
rules and factors are significant. While no program can avoid using both rules 
and factors, different programs employ each technique to differing degrees. 
Because all redress programs contain a complex set of assessment techniques, 
policy makers must concern themselves with how these are organized. Secondary 
assessment techniques, such as standards and guidelines, structure the use of 
primary assessment techniques.
Assessors use standards to establish if  an application presents a certain 
category of fact(s). A standard is rule-like in that its satisfaction specifies a 
particular outcome. In practice, some standards are, in fact, fulfilled by rules. 
For example, Redress WA did not accept psychological reports as evidence—an 
illustration of a rule prescribing the application of a standard (Government of 
Western Australia 2010, 12-3). Other standards may contain one or more factors 
that require assessors to exercise judgment. As an example, recall how Redress 
WA categorized applications into four grades (standards) of severity using a 
range of factors.
Standards are retrospective, they categorize existing facts. By contrast, 
guidelines indicate how assessors should proceed. Guidelines use rules to limit 
discretion. An example appears in Ireland’s Industrial Schools program (2003-
11), which redressed survivors of residential schools and similar institutions.3 
That program benchmarked successful applications using five grades (standards) 
3 For information on Ireland’s Industrial Schools program, see The Compensation Advisory 
Committee (2002).
8 | POLITICS & POLICy / Month 2020
of severity (McCarthy 2016). Each standard corresponded to a limited points 
range. Having first assigned the applicant to a standard, assessors then used 
factors to assign a specific points value within the corresponding range. That 
guideline uses a rule to restrict the ambit of, without prescribing, judgment. 
Another type of guideline sets presumptive rules operative in the absence of 
specific considerations. So, for example, the maximum payment in that Irish 
program was €300,000. However, assessors had discretion in “exceptional” cases 
(a standard) to add up to 20 percent to the settlement. That discretionary 
provision turned a rule into a guideline.
Standards and guidelines structure the use of rules and factors. They help 
decompose complex procedures into discrete components. That simplification 
facilitates transparency: simpler assessment is easier to perform, understand, 
and predict. Moreover, these secondary techniques enable fairness by making 
assessment more accurate and fairer. And finally, by organizing information 
they help reduce the costs of assessment for survivors and for states. However, 
just as standards and guidelines produce certain advantages, they bear the trade-
offs involved in applying their composite rules and factors.
Tertiary Assessment Techniques
Tertiary techniques provide comprehensive organization. The matrix is a 
common tertiary device that structures the use of secondary and primary 
assessment techniques. Different programs use matrices in different ways. 
Ireland’s Magdalene program had a two-step matrix that converted residence 
duration directly into a settlement value. More complex programs, like Redress 
WA, use a three-step (or more) process. Some complex programs move different 
aspects of a claim through different matrices before aggregating the results to 
arrive at a monetary value. A good example is Canada’s Individual Assessment 
Process (IAP).4 The IAP (2007-16) was a component part of the Indian 
Residential School Settlement Agreement, which provided an array of remedial 
initiatives for survivors of Canada’s genocidal residential schools.
Canada’s IAP disaggregated four grounds of eligibility: the experience of 
abuse, aggravating factors, psychosocial consequential harm, and consequential 
loss of opportunity. Each subcomponent used a matrix comprised of guidelines 
and standards that applied rules and indicated which factors were relevant 
to each part of the procedure. To illustrate, the IAP provided more points to 
survivors who experienced harm that included “severe post-traumatic stress 
disorder” than those assessed with a “mild traumatic stress disorder” (Indian 
Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat 2018). Those two standards 
(severe and mild) were part of a rule: a claim with a severe posttraumatic stress 
disorder was assigned to a higher category in the “Consequential Harm” matrix, 
while a mild disorder was assessed at a lower standard. The IAP’s matrices also 
4 For information on Canada’s IAP, see Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat 
(2018).
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employed factors. For example, the severity of injury depended, in part, on the 
frequency of abusive experiences. The program distinguished “one or more” 
incidences of anal or vaginal penetration from “persistent” penetrative incidents 
(Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat 2018). Assessors exercised 
discretion over what factors distinguished “one or more” from a “persistent” 
standard of frequency.
Matrices clearly, and visually, indicate what information is relevant to what 
part of a complex process. As previously noted, that form of transparency 
promotes cost-effective evidence provision and speedier assessment. Moreover, 
by decomposing the assessment process, matrices structure step-by-step 
procedures. In doing so, matrices promote fairness between applicants by helping 
ensure that similar cases are treated in the same way (Royal Commission into 
Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse 2015, 21). Insofar as matrices 
enable applicants to understand how the process should operate, they can help 
applicants to identify errors and reduce discretion, facilitating some aspects of 
agency and reducing unfairness.
However, matrices have negative consequences for agency as well. A matrix 
reduces human suffering to discrete figures and cells, abstracting from the 
survivor’s lived experience. Because only particular elements of their injuries 
are relevant to the assessment of value, a matrix can prescind from what 
survivors think salient (Diller 2003). In addition, survivors often object to the 
way matrices appear to grade their injuries like “meat” (Feldthusen, Hankivsky, 
and Greaves 2000, 109; Miller 2017, 127). Reflecting upon the character of 
comprehensive assessment procedures, Robyn Green (2016, 153) argues that, 
in programs like Canada’s IAP, “a therapeutic ethos and the law overlap to 
discipline compensation claimants as dysfunctional individuals in need of repair 
from the state.”
Design Considerations
The preceding analysis illustrates some of the unavoidable trade-offs “hard-
wired” in all redress programs. Program design determines which trade-offs 
occur at different points in the assessment process. The analysis now turns to 
three prominent program design considerations relevant to those decisions: the 
use of different evidentiary standards; the redress of consequential damage; and 
the responsiveness of a program’s payment values. These applied discussions 
demonstrate the practical relevance of the analysis and explore some methods 
used to mitigate some of the negative effects that trade-offs entail.
Evidentiary Standards
An evidentiary standard concerns the quality of evidence needed to validate 
a claim. Relevant considerations include the quantity of applicable information, 
its reliability and the presence or absence of contradictory factors. “Higher” 
10 | POLITICS & POLICy / Month 2020
standards of evidence require better quality and/or more information; while 
“lower” standards of evidence accept claims supported by poorer quality and/
or lower quantities of evidence. As a result, low standards of evidence can 
jeopardize a program’s integrity, while high standards may exclude potential 
claims.
In litigation, the “balance of probabilities” requires plaintiffs to establish 
that their version of events is the most probable. Few redress programs require all 
aspects of a claim to meet that high standard. Good evidence is rarely available 
for claims that arise from injurious events occurring years, if  not decades, 
previously. Records are lost, people become less able to recall details of events, 
and their chronology becomes less accurate. Mental and physical illnesses can 
further degrade the quality of testimony.
Responding to those (and other) challenges, redress programs often indicate 
that they employ a “plausibility” evidentiary standard: applicants are believed 
unless there is disconfirming evidence. But programs can apply different 
evidentiary standards to different aspects of a claim. For example, an assessor in 
Ireland’s industrial schools’ program might apply a higher standard to evidence 
of residence when they could access robust institutional residency records. 
By comparison, they might apply a lower evidentiary standard to claims of 
neglect—Irish institutions were very unlikely to record that they neglected a 
child. Better programs match the appropriate evidentiary standard to the 
appropriate grounds of eligibility—even relatively simple programs can have 
multiple evidentiary standards.
Unfairness may arise when different assessors apply evidentiary standards 
differently. This problem is prominent in complicated, factor-based programs 
that employ numerous assessors to make a series of difficult judgments. 
Programs can take mitigating measures, such as providing all assessors with 
standardized training (Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat 
2011). Further, using multimember assessment panels is fairness-promoting 
because a panel’s decisions must be mutually justified among its members, 
which reduces discretion and helps develop common practices among assessors 
(Audit and Assurance Services Branch 2015). Canada developed a precedential 
database to improve both transparency and fairness. However, those mitigating 
techniques add costs to, and potentially slow down, the assessment process.
Some programs use what is sometimes called, after an Australian case, 
the “Briginshaw” principle, wherein more serious abuses (which might attract 
higher-value settlements) require more robust evidence (Royal Commission into 
Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse 2015, 367). However, Briginshaw 
variability may be unfair to those with more serious injuries. Many programs 
treat sexual abuse as the most severe form of injury. yet historic claims for sexual 
abuse are unlikely to have strong confirming evidence. Therefore, imposing 
higher evidentiary standards for more grievous injuries may disadvantage those 
claimants. When the severity of the injury depends on complex factor-based 
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assessment, unfairness also arises from inequalities between survivors. In 
Redress WA, application quality was “strongly linked to the literacy level of the 
applicant… This had the potential to significantly disadvantage applicants with 
poor literacy skills” (Western Australian Department for Communities n.d., 9). 
The advantages enjoyed by better-resourced survivors can be reinforcing and 
comprehensive. Better-resourced applicants may be more likely to get expert 
assistance, obtain their personal records, and receive treatment for physical and 
psychological complaints: they will have, as a consequence, better evidence. That 
unfairness may be aggravated if  more serious injuries are associated with greater 
disadvantages, and therefore, lower quality applications.
Fairness may justify the use of easier-to-satisfy evidentiary standards. 
As evidentiary standards decrease, per-case assessment should speed-up and 
application numbers increase. Per-case procedural costs will decrease because, if  
applicants need to provide lesser quality, and lower quantities of, evidence, that 
data will be less costly to administer and survivors will be less burdened by its 
provision. But lower evidentiary standards entail trade-offs. In programs that 
calibrate payments to the severity of injury, lower evidentiary standards should 
be associated with the success of more, and more high-value, claims. That makes 
programs more costly.
In addition, lower evidentiary standards may make it harder for programs to 
detect false claims, raising integrity concerns. Because human memory is 
suggestible, survivors may submit false claims without fraudulent intent. 
Research indicates that people will populate autobiographical memories with 
suggested details (Bernstein, Nourkova, and Loftus 2008). It would be surprising 
if  the popular dissemination of abuse narratives in various media forms did not 
affect survivors’ memories. Low evidentiary standards also invite fraud. As an 
illustrative example, the Canadian province of Nova Scotia operated a redress 
program (1995-2000) that validated some claims of abuse by reference to their 
compatibility with findings in a public report.5 Those assessors applied a simple 
rule: accept claims that match patterns of abuse described in the report. A review 
of that program found that awareness of the program’s low evidentiary standards 
among potential applicants prompted numerous fraudulent claims (Kaufman 
2002). Fraudulent applicants crafted their applications to match descriptions 
that assessors were likely to accept.
Lower evidentiary standards favor fairness at the cost of integrity. However, 
programs can leverage their large data capacity to mitigate that challenge. 
Conventional litigation employs higher evidentiary standards because, in most 
cases, courts have evidence about a single case only. But redress programs 
obtain hundreds, if  not thousands, of applications. Moreover, they often follow 
or accompany public inquiries that investigate injurious care experiences. As 
a result, assessors can use common (similar-fact) evidence. There are different 
5 For information on the Nova Scotian program, see Kaufman (2002).
12 | POLITICS & POLICy / Month 2020
models for deploying common evidence. Redress WA used information provided 
by applicants to compile historical dossiers on institutional practices and staffing. 
That larger evidential pool might strengthen weaker applications to improve 
fairness. Similarly, the use of common evidence can mitigate some concerns 
with integrity, if  false claims are discovered by reference to the preponderance 
of contradictory common evidence.
Mitigating techniques do not eliminate the need for trade-offs. A database 
of common evidence will tend to have more information about some care 
experiences than it will regarding others. For example, programs will tend to 
receive more applications from care residences with larger populations, such as 
orphanages. Larger institutions tend to have better and more comprehensive 
records. By contrast, a survivor of abuse or neglect in a foster family may be 
the only applicant with any information about their care placement and will not 
benefit from a common evidence pool, which is unfair.
To conclude this discussion, policy makers must decide what evidentiary 
standards to apply to different aspects of the assessment process. Any choice has 
consequences. Because all redress programs confront problems with evidence, 
high evidentiary standards will exclude meritorious claims, create inequities, 
harm survivors, and slow the process down, while lower standards create 
concerns with cost and integrity. Because these trade-offs can be mitigated, but 
not eliminated, policy makers should ensure that their choice of evidentiary 
standard is rational with respect to their desired outcomes.
Consequential Damage
Consequential damage consists of harms caused by injurious experiences 
in care. The potential harms are diverse, including damage to survivors’ 
psychological, physical, and financial well-being; their family relationships, 
career prospects, and cultural affiliations (Carr et al. 2019). Research into the 
damage caused by systemic abuse and neglect is ongoing, with recent information 
indicating potential biological effects at the level of the genome (Wetsman 2018).
Some programs do not remedy consequential damage. Others redress a 
small range of consequential harms using simple rules. Recall how Ireland’s 
Magdalene program provided all validated applicants with the equivalent of 
a full contributory pension. That provision was justified because their unpaid 
forced labor in a laundry denied some survivors opportunities for employment 
that would have made them eligible for a contributory pension (Quirke 2013). But 
the program did not investigate whether specific individuals suffered that harm—
the rule simply prescribed an outcome. Other programs match redress to the 
harmful experience of each individual using factor-based assessment. Examples 
of factor-dominant approaches include the Canadian IAP, Ireland’s Industrial 
Schools program, and Redress WA. Those programs confronted significant 
assessment difficulties with uncertain evidence and intrusive assessment. Both 
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considerations tend to increase program costs, slow assessment down, and harm 
survivors.
Some observers worry that redressing consequential damage will “punish” 
some survivors (Hansard 2009, CA56; Western Australian Department for 
Communities n.d., 7). That concern can be understood in different ways. 
One point relevant to evidence can be quickly stated. Inequities arise if  some 
applicants find it harder to present typical forms of factor-based evidence. For 
example, psychological damage is often associated with other consequential 
harms, such as educational failings and persistent unemployment (Carr et al. 
2019). A resilient survivor might not present those “typical” evidentiary forms 
and find it harder to evidence psychological damage. That is unfair.
A second point relevant to evidence also concerns fairness and arises from 
the absence of an appropriate baseline from which to make judgments. The point 
depends upon how consequential damage is assessed using counterfactuals, a 
methodology that raises interesting questions well beyond this discussion (see 
Vernon 2012). In brief, an assessor adjudicates harmful effects by imagining 
how the survivor would be if  an injurious experience did not occur, and then 
comparing the actual world with that counterfactual “baseline.” If  a survivor 
is to claim consequential damage, they need to show that there is a plausible 
baseline world in which they would not have experienced the relevant harm. 
Assessors use a variety of causal factors to construct plausible baseline worlds 
using what they know of the survivor’s personal circumstances.
This technique creates unfairness when multiply disadvantaged survivors 
have a harder time establishing the plausibility of “better” baseline worlds. A 
good example is the Canadian IAP’s redress of income loss. The maximum 
redress for income loss (CDN$250,000) almost doubled the monies that were 
otherwise available, but the assessment process imposed a high standard of 
evidence. A valid claim needed to demonstrate a financial injury by reference 
to baseline income that the survivor could reasonably expect to enjoy had it 
not been for harms attributable to injuries suffered in care. That component 
of the IAP paid very large sums of money to a very few survivors (18 of the 
38,262 applicants) who experienced consequential harm(s) that caused them to 
lose a job or work reduced hours (Galloway 2017). But the program did not 
pay equivalent redress for those who never had a good career: those survivors 
could not point to factors that would construct a plausible baseline income that 
could be damaged. That inequity enabled some better-off  survivors to claim 
actual income loss but denied redress to those whose were worse off, whose 
injuries might contribute to their economic marginalization. Beyond the glaring 
unfairness, it is irrational for a program to redress a ground of eligibility using 
evidentiary standards that only .04 percent of applicants satisfied.
The compounding effects of multiple disadvantage complicate causal 
links between past events and present damage. As stated previously, survivor 
populations suffer disproportionately from physical and mental illness and 
experience higher-than-average rates of homelessness, unemployment, and 
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illiteracy. With extremely marginalized populations, like the indigenous peoples 
of Canada, the problem of the baseline is acute: what is normal for survivors 
may be, at least in part, be a consequence of systemic injustice (Wilk, Maltby, 
and Cooke 2017). Again, factor-based assessment creates inequities that 
disadvantage the worst-affected survivors most.
To judge that a consequential harm was caused by historical wrongdoing 
requires assessors to trace the causal influence of a range of potential factors over 
long periods of time. It can be challenging to distinguish consequential damage 
caused by injuries experienced in care from the consequences of numerous other 
factors (Government of Western Australia 2010). Assessors making causal 
judgments may find it impossible to ascertain, even approximately, what the 
“true” consequences of historic abuse may be. Some survivors may oversubscribe 
blame for personal failings, while others will fail to lodge otherwise eligible claims 
because they do not associate psychological disorders and other disadvantages 
with their injurious experience.
Ireland’s Magdalene program illustrates a common technique to mitigate 
the problem of assigning causation. The pension provision in that program 
presumed that all survivors experience a consequential harm and applies a rule: 
redress all claimants as if  they suffer that harm. (A similar approach could use 
a guideline—make a payment unless a countervailing factor is identified.) Other 
programs might require survivors to present evidence that they experience(d) 
certain harms but not require individualized evidence of injurious causation. 
For example, it is well established that abuse-in-care can create psychological 
disorders (Featherstone 2018). Presuming a causal linkage, a program could 
redress all applicants with a diagnosed disorder. Since the disadvantages that 
survivors experience as a population are significant, a program could assess 
causation at the level of the population and apply a rule to redress all applicants 
presenting the identified consequential damage.
The shift from factor- to rule-based assessment involves trade-offs. As 
with any rule-based assessment, such programs must determine what harmful 
consequences they will redress ex ante. That task is challenging, for the harmful 
outcomes of injurious experiences in care are extremely diverse and expert 
knowledge in this area is evolving rapidly. If  the rule prescribes redress for only 
some harms, it is likely to exclude some valid claims. But if  the rule is broader, 
the program will redress more harms that are not caused by care experiences—
reducing its integrity.
In response to this problem, some programs—an example is Ireland’s 
Industrial Schools program—employ medical and other professionals to report 
on consequential damage experienced by claimants. Outsourcing assessment 
allows program officials to justify assessment decisions using expert opinions. 
It also enables survivors to obtain individuated assessments by an impartial 
professional. Those examinations sometimes lead to the discovery of previously 
undiagnosed injuries or the attribution of known pathologies to injurious care 
experiences. But getting expert evidence adds time and cost, both psychological 
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and financial, to the program. Moreover, professionals confront the same 
complex set of evidentiary factors as program officials. If  the medical (or 
other) professional eschews causal analysis and simply warrants that a survivor 
experiences harm that is plausibly associated with their care experiences, the 
program confronts the same trade-off  between fairness and integrity confronting 
any rule-based approach to evidence: some applicants will present harm that 
correlates with, but is not caused by, abuse in care.
Because redress for damage caused by wrongdoing tends to be added to 
payments for those experiences, adding consequential damage to the grounds 
of eligibility usually increases program costs for states. Moreover, assessing 
consequential damage increases the amount of information both states and 
survivors must provide and process. The uncertainty involved in assessing 
consequential damage encourages redress programs to obtain more information 
to offset the poor quality of the evidence, leading to more intrusive assessments. 
Moreover, as the program becomes more complicated and harder to navigate, 
survivors have greater need of expert assistance (lawyers), which further increases 
procedural costs.
In addition, the type of evidence required to assess consequential damage 
can be invasive and alienating. When programs attempt to isolate the causal 
influence of injurious care, they require information about all other potential 
causal factors. This assessment embraces the applicant’s entire life, including 
deeply personal information. The invasive (and pervasive) character of the 
assessment reflects both the fact that relevant damage may affect the entirety 
of the person and the need to determine the role(s) of any coincidental factors 
in causing the specified damage. Moreover, the prospect of monetary redress 
may encourage survivors to portray aspects of their person, including their 
life choices and undesirable character traits, as consequential damage. That 
representation is alienating because it involves characterizing aspects that are 
(or should be) integral to the survivor as discrete from, and hostile to, them 
(Winter 2017). As a result, testifying to consequential damage may increase the 
psychological costs of redress for survivors who must describe who they are and 
what they have done in strongly negative terms.
Assessing consequential damage requires trade-offs. Given the costs to both 
programs and survivors of evidencing consequence damage, better programs 
will not require applicants to provide that evidence. But some do. Redress WA 
combined questions concerning wrongs experienced while in care and questions 
concerning consequential damage in the same section of the application form. 
Completing that section (Section 5) was mandatory, therefore, all applicants had 
to apply for the redress of consequential damage (a copy of the application 
form is on file with the author). The resulting difficulties led one synoptic 
report on Redress WA to recommend that future programs avoid redressing 
consequential damage (Western Australian Department for Communities n.d.). 
That broad recommendation is unwarranted, but it is certainly irrational to 
make consequential damage a necessary component of redress.
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Conversion Ratio Responsiveness
The above discussions of evidentiary standards and consequential damage 
concern how redress programs assess facts. As previously mentioned, programs 
often use matrices to translate those facts into standards corresponding to 
point values, which assessors then aggregate to assign an overall score for 
the application. That total score specifies a final monetary value. While the 
processes are conceptually distinct (first assign points to an application, then, 
assign a monetary value), in practice the two operations are interdependent. The 
responsiveness of the points-to-money conversion rate affects how a program 
assesses facts, and therefore, entails trade-offs between the accuracy, speed, and 
intrusiveness (cost) of the assessment process.
A conversion ratio can be variably responsive. Highly responsive programs 
may vary monetary values in step with every point. For example, recall how the 
Irish Industrial Schools program used five standards of severity corresponding 
to discrete point ranges. Each point range corresponded to a €50,000 band. (The 
band for the most severe claims was larger and spanned €200-300,000.) The 
program rounded its settlement values to the nearest thousand euros; however, 
the lower four severity standards corresponded to a range of fewer than 50 points. 
In the four lower bands, which encompassed over 99 percent of settlements paid, 
every point made a significant difference to the monetary outcome. In effect, 
when the assessors assigned a specific score to the application that point value 
entailed a guideline specifying a narrow range within each €50,000 band. This is 
an example of highly responsive conversion ratio.
Queensland’s Ex Gratia Scheme (2007-08) was less responsive.6 Queensland 
divided its program into two levels. Level 1 required minimal evidence of injury 
and all successful applicants received identical settlements of A$7,000. 
Queensland’s Level 2 process invited applicants to supply more robust evidence 
in pursuit of an additional payment. Level 2 assessment assigned each successful 
claim to one of four severity standards: a rule then prescribed a specific payment 
value of either A$6,000, A$14,000, A$22,000, or A$33,000—each value 
corresponding to one of the four standards of severity. In principle, Queensland’s 
less-responsive stratification could require less intrusive assessment, because 
assessors could make more approximate judgments without affecting the 
monetary outcome. A less-responsive conversion ratio may make assessment 
simpler because it may be easier to see how an application fits within a broader, 
rather than narrower, range of factors. In programs with a maximum standard, 
the most grievous cases might be quickly assigned to the highest standard. 
Therefore, a less-responsive conversion ratio could decrease processing time and 
generate greater certainty that the claim has obtained an appropriate result.
Turning to survivors, a less-responsive assessment process could be more 
transparent and put less pressure on applicants. If  the matrices are published 
6 For information on the Queensland program, see Royal Commission into Institutional Responses 
to Child Sexual Abuse (2015).
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(Queensland’s was not) efficient applicants may choose to leave out some factor-
based evidence if  they aim to meet the minimum standard for a specific range. 
For example, a survivor who was subject to two similar abusive events might need 
to describe only one event to obtain redress at the relevant standard. Moreover, 
considered practically, an applicant who scores in the bottom or middle of a 
points range will have less incentive to seek a rescoring if  a small change is 
unlikely to result in a different monetary outcome. So long as marginal cases are, 
as a rule, “rounded up,” a broader range, with less-responsive conversions ratios, 
might create procedural cost-savings for both states and survivors.
The analysis suggests that the epistemic depth of assessment should match 
the responsiveness of the payment structure. But some programs do not fit that 
pattern. The program created by Sweden’s Financial Redress Act (2012) is an 
example.7 Sweden’s program (2013-14) combined an invasive assessment of the 
survivor’s individual circumstances with a rigid payment structure. The 
assessment process was slow, amassed large amounts of evidence and subjected 
the survivors to potentially re-traumatizing interviews. yet, despite the epistemic 
depth of the assessment process, all validated claims received the same amount 
of money, SEK 250,000. That program design is irrational.
Finally, while less-responsive ratios can be faster, less harmful, and impose 
lower costs, the trade-off  is a form of unfairness. Research with survivors 
indicates a widespread expectation that redress values should correspond to 
the degree of injury (Lundy and Mahoney 2018). Weakly responsive points-
to-payment ratios provide the same redress for very different injuries, risking 
false, and unfair equivalences between very different injurious experiences. 
Insofar as payment values are a form of communicative acknowledgment, false 
equivalences between very different experiences may undermine the value of 
redress for survivors.
Conclusion
The analysis demonstrates how the basic tools used to assess redress claims 
entail trade-offs between important values. The values involved are diverse and 
different trade-offs cluster around different assessment techniques. Drawing 
upon the Institutional Analysis and Development methodology, the normative 
analysis of assessment tools—rules, factors, standards, guidelines, and matrices—
helps explain why different programs, or different aspects of a programs, involve 
differing trade-offs. Moreover, it shows why particular trade-offs are hard to 
avoid. That information can help both survivors and state officials understand 
the operation of redress programs better. In turn, knowing what is likely to 
happen may assist survivors who participate in redress programs, which might 
lead to better outcomes.
7 For information on Sweden’s program, see Sköld, Sandin, and Schiratzki 2020(2020).
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Although the trade-offs involved in assessing redress claims are contextually 
nuanced and complex, some abstract points are worth summarizing. As a 
primary technique, rules tend to encourage quicker assessment that reduces 
procedural resource needed by both survivors and the program, while imposing 
lower psychological costs upon survivors. In addition, rules help, when published, 
make the program transparent and promote fairness because all applicants are 
treated similarly. However, rules are inflexible—diminishing survivor agency—
and, consequentially, less effective in settling meritorious claims because they 
tend to limit the ambit of the program. They can also diminish the program’s 
integrity.
By contrast, the use of factors tends to increase a program’s ambit, making 
it more effective in settling a wider range of meritorious claims and enabling 
programs to better respond to the survivor’s unique circumstances, improving 
the agency of the survivor in the program. The use of more invasive factor-
based assessment can also improve the program’s integrity. However, the use 
of factors in assessment will tend to make the program slower and will impose 
greater costs upon programs and survivors, including higher psychological costs 
for survivors. The discretion entailed by factor-based assessment will also tend 
to make programs less transparent and less fair.
Secondary techniques, such as standards and guidelines, structure the use 
of primary tools. They decompose assessment into distinct procedural steps, 
enabling greater transparency and fairness, while reducing monetary costs. 
Similar points apply to matrices, which as a tertiary technique, helps to organize 
primary and secondary tools. However, all secondary and tertiary techniques 
bear the trade-offs inherent to their composite primary elements. In addition, 
they discipline survivor agency by enforcing procedural structures with the 
potential to impose alienating processes and values upon survivors.
That critical analysis also has prescriptive implications. Because different 
procedural arrangements create trade-offs that affect different participants 
differently, there may be no “all-things-considered” best way to assess redress 
claims. However, programs can avoid incurring unnecessary sacrifices through 
poor design. Irrational programs, such as those that require survivors to apply 
for consequential damage, like Redress WA; or that use intrusive and costly 
factor-based assessment in the service of rigid payment structures, like Sweden’s, 
demonstrate errors that better program design can avoid. More rational design 
is likely to create better redress programs and better outcomes for participants.
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